Inflation targeting countries generally define the inflation objective in terms of the consumer price index. Studies in the academic literature, however, reach conflicting conclusions concerning which measure of inflation a central bank should target in a small open economy. This paper examines the properties of domestic, CPI, and real-exchange-rate-adjusted (REX) inflation targeting. In one class of open economy New Keynesian models there is an isomorphism between optimal monetary policy in an open versus closed economy. In the type of model we consider, where the real exchange rate appears in the Phillips curve, this isomorphism breaks down; openness matters. REX inflation targeting restores the isomorphism but this may not be desirable. Instead, under domestic and CPI inflation targeting the exchange rate channel can be exploited to enhance the effects of monetary policy. Our results indicate that CPI inflation targeting can deliver price stability across the three inflation objectives and will be desirable to a central bank with a high aversion to inflation instability. REX inflation targeting does well in delivering output stability and has a relative advantage in economies where demand shocks are predominant. In general, the choice of the inflation objective affects the trade-offs between policy goals and thus policy choices and outcomes.
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Inflation targeting requires the choice of a specific inflation objective. Countries that have adopted inflation targeting define the objective in terms of the consumer price index [Svensson (2011) ]. This choice is not surprising as inflation targeting countries tend to be small open economies where import inflation is a concern. Performance is typically measured by the central bank's ability to keep annual or mean CPI inflation within a target band or close to a numerical target.
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The academic literature on monetary policy acknowledges that the choice of which measure of inflation to target is important (Woodford (2011) ). Existing studies, however, reach conflicting conclusions about a central bank's appropriate target criterion for inflation in a small open economy. Allsopp, Kara, and Nelson (2006) favor CPI inflation targeting in a New Keynesian model where exchange rate changes act like supply shocks. In contrast, a number of influential contributions to the New Keynesian literature (Aoki (2001) , Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999 , 2002 , Gali and Monacelli (2005) Models such as Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999 , 2002 and Gali and Monacelli (2005) have the stronger implication that optimal policy in an open economy is isomorphic to policy in a closed economy. This view is reflected in a target rule in an open economy which is the same as in a closed economy except that the weight on domestic inflation is now affected by the degree of openness. This isomorphism is a distinctive feature of models where the output gap is the sole conduit through which monetary policy affects the Phillips curve. Domestic inflation is affected by the wedge between the world price (in domestic currency) and the home currency price set by importers of the consumption good. In Monacelli (2013) the existence of an imported intermediate input in production calls for both real marginal cost (the inverse of the mark-up) and the terms of trade to be variable. 5 Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2011), Engel (2010) , Benigno and Benigno (2006) , and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002) confirmed by recent survey evidence compiled by Greenslade and Parker (2012) Section 3 discusses the three flexible inflation targeting strategies. A performance analysis is carried out and commented on in Section 4. Section 5 compares policy under discretion to policy with commitment from a timeless perspective. Section 6 concludes.
The Building Blocks of the Model
A. An Open Economy Phillips Curve
The central building block for our open economy Phillips curve is the firm's pricing equation. Recent evidence from surveys [Greenslade and Parker (2012) and Parker (2012) ] as well as from micro data Ellis (2012a), (2012b) ] indicate wide divergence in pricing behavior within and across sectors of the economy. These studies cast doubt on whether any one theory of price setting can adequately capture all the important features of firm pricing. In particular the popular specification of Calvo (1983) pricing supplemented by "rule of thumb" indexation appears to describe actual pricing behavior of only a small minority of firms. Given the heterogeneity of firm pricing behavior, any aggregate price setting equation will be an approximation aimed at capturing some central features of the process.
The pricing framework here emphasizes three elements, each of which receives support from surveys. First, we assume firms follow mark-up pricing influenced by the benchmark prices of competing domestic firms. Second, we assume that there is price stickiness due to 6 menu costs. Menu costs include not just the physical costs of price changes but are also the result of implicit and explicit contracts as well as coordination problems. We model these elements of optimal price setting within an extension of Rotemberg's (1982) quadratic cost adjustment model of monopolistically competitive firms. In our openeconomy version of the model an optimizing firm sets the price of output so that the overall cost function which consists of three separate components is minimized. The objective function of the typical firm j is:
where: In an open economy, as explained previously, firms are concerned about competitiveness abroad as well as at home. Define the terms of trade (or real exchange rate)
as the domestic currency price of foreign output relative to the price of domestic output. The firm-specific terms of trade measure a representative firm's price competitiveness vis-à-vis foreign competition. Changes in its terms of trade make it difficult for the firm to maintain its presence in established markets abroad and interfere with laying out roadmaps (product design, export strategies) for the future. To avoid changes in its terms of trade caused by sudden exchange rate movements or foreign price movements both of which are beyond its control, the firm is required to alter its price. Menu costs make this costly.
The firm sets the price of its output in domestic currency. Taking the first-order condition and running the expectations operator through it, we can characterize the relationship between past, current, and future prices as well as the current and expected change in the terms of trade as:
From equation (2) it is evident that the current and the expected change in the firm-specific terms of trade matter in setting the price at time t. The greater a -the relative weight on the change in the terms of trade in the total cost function -compared to c, the relative weight on costly price changes, the more current and expected changes in the terms of trade factor in the decision to change the price in the current period. As stated above, changes in the current nominal exchange rate and changes in the price charged by competing foreign firms are 13 From the definition of the firm-specific terms of trade and the fact that the firm cannot influence the price set by foreign competitors or the nominal exchange rate it follows that 8 exogenous to the firm. Yet such changes affect a domestic firm's terms of trade, i.e. its competitiveness. The only way that a domestic firm can counteract such pressure is to adjust its domestic price in such a way so that overall costs are minimized.
Next, consider the formation of the firm's optimal mark-up price:
where all variables are as previously defined. 
where 14 Equation (3) is the same as the one proposed by Roberts (1995) . Within a general equilibrium framework, the co-movement between marginal cost and economic activity can be established by combining the labor supply and demand relations with the market clearing condition in the goods market. On this point see Gertler (2001, 2002) or Gali and Monacelli (2005) who derive a similar relation that stresses the positive relation between real marginal cost and domestic consumption.
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Compared to the standard closed-economy Phillips curve, the open-economy representation features a more expansive expectations channel that operates through expected changes in the real exchange rate. In addition, the current period change in the real exchange rate exerts a direct effect on domestic inflation. Thus, in the open-economy framework described below the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is not solely through the output gap.
B. Model for a Small Open Economy
The complete model for a small open economy consists of four equations:
the rate of domestic inflation Equation (4) is the open-economy Phillips curve. Equation (5) is the open economy IS relation that features a real interest rate and real exchange rate channel. A foreign output shock and an idiosyncratic shock affect demand for domestic output.
17 Equation (6) is the linearized uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition: apart from a stochastic risk premium ( ) agents are assumed to trade in a frictionless international bond market. More formally, the stochastic disturbances are modeled as follows:
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We treat all foreign variables as exogenous random variables that are independent of each other. Finally, equation (7) describes the relationship between the CPI inflation rate, the domestic inflation rate, the real exchange rate, and consumption openness (γ) under perfect exchange rate pass-through.
Targeting Different Measures of Inflation: Optimal Monetary Policy under Discretion
Woodford ( 
A. Targeting Domestic Inflation
In the first strategy we consider, the rate of inflation is defined in terms of changes in the level of domestic prices. The explicit objective function that the central bank attempts to minimize is given by:
 is the discount rate and  represents the relative weight the policymaker attaches to the squared deviations of the rate of domestic inflation from target. Equation (8) implies that the policymaker's sole concern rests with the output gap and domestic inflation.
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To set the stage for illustrating how optimal policy in the open economy is determined, it is helpful at the outset to reduce the dimension of the optimization problem to one involving only two constraints. Two simple steps need to be taken. First, substitute for the rate of CPI inflation in equation (5). Second, substitute the UIP condition into the IS equation. The optimization problem can then be expressed as:
22 The mandate for central banks is often restricted to ensuring price and output stability. In countries like New Zealand the overriding goal of monetary policy is to guarantee price stability without causing undue fluctuations in the real economy, interest rates, and the exchange rate. Thus variables other than the rate of inflation and the output gap could appear in the central bank's objective function. Indeed, Blanchard et al (2010, p. 210 Equation (10) The preceding section showed that the existence of a real exchange rate channel in the Phillips curve is instrumental in shaping the target rule for an open economy. Both the current and expected change in the real exchange rate appears on the right-hand side of the Phillips curve, which is shown again for convenience below.
The Phillips curve can be rewritten as
as the domestic rate of inflation purged of the real exchange rate effect allows us to rewrite the original open-economy Phillips curve as
Written in this form, equation (12) looks like the original Phillips curve. The only difference between equation (4) and equation (12) pertains to the definition of the rate inflation.
The remaining two equations of the model can be rewritten in terms of the real-exchangerate-adjusted rate of inflation:
The last required change involves modifying the objective function of the policymaker. The target variable for inflation is now the real-exchange-rate-adjusted rate of inflation.
After substitution of equation (14) into equation (13) 
Solving the optimization problem yields the target rule under REX inflation targeting:
As in the closed-economy model, only the Phillips curve parameter κ appears in the target rule. Demand-side parameters have no role to play. Combining equation (16) 
Combining the first-order conditions of the optimization problem leads to the following target rule: 
where ( ).
By definition, the CPI inflation rate depends in part on the degree of openness multiplied by a change in the real exchange rate. Thus, if the policymaker changes the policy instrument in response to an IS shock, the real exchange rate changes, which in turn filters through to the CPI inflation rate. Attempting to prevent the output gap from changing does not work in the present case because the rate of CPI inflation is directly affected by changes in the real exchange rate.
Solutions for the endogenous variables and the policy instrument and their variances can be obtained by combining equation (20) with equations (18) and (19).
Assessing the Performance of the Flexible Inflation Targeting Strategies
The previous section establishes that, depending on the choice of an inflation objective, With > the relative weight on inflation under CPI inflation targeting is greater than the relative weight on inflation under domestic inflation targeting. Also, the relative weight on the real exchange rate in the CPI inflation target rule is greater than its counterpart in the domestic inflation target rule. This is because the numerator of the coefficient on is greater in the CPI inflation target rule than in the domestic inflation target rule.
In general, the size of the relative weight on inflation and the real exchange rate in the respective target rule reflects the importance of these two variables vis-à-vis the output gap in the setting of policy under the three regimes.
In the case of flexible inflation targeting where both the inflation and the output gap objective are deemed important or non-negligible, the size of the relative weights in the target rules should convey information about the variability of those variables that explicitly or implicitly figure in all three target rules. 27 These variables are the output gap and the real exchange rate. According to Table 1A , the relative weights on inflation and the real exchange rate are largest under CPI inflation targeting but smallest under REX inflation targeting. This suggests the following conjectures:
The output gap is most stable under REX inflation targeting.
Conjecture 2:
fluctuations in the real exchange rate should be lowest under CPI inflation targeting but most pronounced under REX inflation targeting where the relative weight on the real exchange rate is zero.
To assess the plausibility of these conjectures, we use a numerical solution procedure with the following plausible parameter values:
The choice of parameter values is explained in the note below Table 1 .
For the computation of the variances of endogenous variables in Section B we assume that all disturbances are independent white noise processes with unit variance.
Using the above parameter values, we calculate the relative weights on the respective rate of inflation and the real exchange rate in the three target rules. These relative weights appear in Table 1B The results of the comparison of the three targeting strategies under discretion are presented in Tables 2, 3 , and 4. Table 4 , only two minor modifications must be made to our assessment of the targeting strategies. Both changes concern the relative standing of domestic inflation targeting: of the three strategies it is now best at controlling the variability of domestic inflation but worst at managing the variability of the real exchange rate. As a final note, we observe that overriding concern with inflation stability leads a central bank to achieve zero inflation variability only under CPI inflation targeting.
C. Policy Frontiers and Inflation-Output Variability Tradeoffs
Additional evidence on the performance of the three flexible inflation targeting strategies can be gleaned by considering the shape and location of policy frontiers which describe the inflation-output variability tradeoffs under each regime. Figure 1 shows the policy frontiers under CPI inflation, domestic, and REX inflation targeting.
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It is immediately apparent that the three targeting strategies produce vastly different inflation-output variability tradeoffs. In Figure 1C , under REX inflation targeting, the inflation-output variability tradeoffs are very compact. There is not much variation in fluctuations of the output gap and the rate of inflation (no matter how inflation is measured).
There are, however, dramatic differences in the loci of the variability tradeoffs. The policy frontier along which CPI inflation variability is traded off for output gap variability under REX inflation targeting is a considerable distance to the right of (and hence inferior to) the policy frontiers that govern the tradeoff between output gap and REX inflation variability and the tradeoff between output gap and domestic inflation variability. Figures 1A and 1B illustrate that CPI inflation and especially domestic inflation targeting give rise to far wider inflation-output variability tradeoffs. These observations admit a simple interpretation: the central bank's relative aversion to inflation variability is of less consequence for the variability of the output gap and all three measures of inflation if it targets REX inflation instead of domestic or CPI inflation.
In two of the three cases considered the inflation rate targeted traces out the most preferred policy frontier, i.e. the one closest to the origin. Figure 1A depicts the three policy frontiers under CPI targeting. The one which describes the tradeoff between the variability of CPI inflation and the output gap lies to the left of those based on REX or domestic inflation.
In Figure 1B we find a similar result: under domestic inflation targeting, the tradeoff between domestic inflation variability and output gap variability occurs to the left of the policy frontiers based on REX inflation or CPI inflation. Figure 1C illustrates a contrary example.
When price stability is of great or medium concern, REX inflation targeting produces a variability tradeoff between itself and the output gap that lies above the variability tradeoff between domestic inflation and the output gap.
A comparison of the three figures also reveals an interesting pattern between CPI inflation and output gap variability under the three strategies. The segment along the lower part of the three policy frontiers (between and is flatter which implies that the tradeoff between CPI inflation and output gap variability is more favorable than the variability tradeoff between domestic / REX inflation and the output gap when the central bank does not care overly about inflation stability. Figure 1D summarizes the behavior of the real exchange rate and the policy instrument under the three targeting strategies. In general, greater emphasis on inflation stability leads to greater variability in both the real exchange rate and the policy instrument.
But there are subtle differences in the way the variances of these two variables evolve as the focus of policy shifts more towards keeping inflation in check. To see how the origin and variability of shocks affects the ranking of the three targeting procedures, we modify the original set-up by increasing the variance of each demand-side disturbance from one to four while the variance of the cost-push shock is kept at one. Table 5 presents the findings with this modification when the central bank is equally concerned about inflation and output gap variability (μ=1). Table 6 shows findings for substantially greater aversion to inflation variability (μ=8).
First, compare the loss scores in the top panels of Tables 5 and 6 to those in Tables 2   and 4 . From a loss minimizing perspective, a central bank with a relatively low aversion to inflation variability (μ=1) does best under REX inflation targeting. The advantage of this strategy increases if shocks to the demand side of the economy are far more variable than the cost-push shock (Table 5 compared to Table 2 ). As the demand-side shocks become more variable, the loss score for REX inflation targeting is unchanged while the loss score for the other two strategies rises. Comparison of Tables 4 and 6 shows, however, that a highly inflation-averse central bank (μ=8) would still choose CPI inflation targeting with highly variable demand-side shocks albeit by a smaller margin.
Thus, as expected, more variability of demand-side shocks favors REX inflation targeting; under this strategy these shocks are perfectly offset by adjusting the interest rate.
CPI inflation targeting is still attractive as can be seen from the rankings of the three strategies if performance is measured by minimizing the variances of each of the inflation measures we consider. Moreover, while the variance of the real exchange rate and nominal interest rate increase for all strategies as demand shocks become more variable, CPI inflation targeting still produces the lowest variance for both. These results hold for either µ=1 or µ=8.
Under REX inflation targeting, the variances of REX inflation and the output gap are not affected by the increase in the size of the demand-side variances. Thus, as far as the stabilization of REX inflation and the output gap is concerned, the performance of CPI inflation relative to REX inflation targeting worsens. This fact helps explain why, from a loss-minimizing point of view, the performance of CPI inflation targeting deteriorates markedly.
To summarize, an increase in the variability of demand-side shocks relative to costpush shocks increases the desirability of REX inflation targeting relative to the other two strategies. Even so, CPI inflation targeting retains its advantage in providing low inflation variability by all measures and results in lower variability of the real exchange rate and policy instrument. The advantage of CPI inflation targeting in producing relatively low inflation variability makes this strategy optimal for the highly inflation-averse policymaker, even in an environment of predominant demand-side shocks (Table 6 ).
Discretion versus Policy from a Timeless Perspective
So far we have considered only policy under discretion. Papers such as Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) or Woodford (1999a Woodford ( , 2003 In our open-economy framework, results under this form of commitment appear in Table 7 , for the case where µ=4, which can be directly compared to Table 3 . The relative ranking of the three strategies on the basis of the loss score is unchanged from that under discretion.
As expected, the output gap is more variable under policy from a timeless perspective than under discretion. The reverse holds for all three definitions of inflation: inflation is less variable under policy from a timeless perspective than discretion. Moreover, all three flexible inflation targeting regimes produce smaller fluctuations of the nominal interest rate under policy from a timeless perspective than discretion. The expectations channel of monetary policy is more potent under commitment than discretion, leading the central bank to use its instrument less aggressively. Real exchange rate variability increases under policy from a timeless perspective as the gain of greater inflation and instrument stability is moderated by a somewhat greater burden on the real exchange rate to adjust.
The welfare gains of commitment relative to discretion are shown in the top righthand panel of Table 7 . These gains are largest under REX inflation targeting, amounting to almost 15 percent. Under domestic inflation targeting the welfare gain is almost 14 percent.
In contrast the benefits associated with policy from a timeless perspective relative to discretion are less than 8 percent under CPI inflation targeting.
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The stabilization bias is most pronounced under discretionary REX inflation targeting because this strategy assigns a rather large weight to the output gap in the target rule.
Consequently, the gains from moving from discretion to commitment are greatest under REX inflation targeting which is akin to carrying out policy in a closed economy. Under domestic or CPI inflation targeting the weight on the output gap in the target rule is smaller, leading to a smaller stabilization bias and hence smaller welfare gains under commitment.
31 Results have also been computed for the case where the central bank's relative aversion to inflation variability is lower (µ=1). In this case the welfare gains from commitment are smaller, ranging from 9.09 percent under REX targeting to 4.55 percent under CPI targeting. It is again the case that the relative ranking of the strategies by loss score is unchanged from that under discretion Notwithstanding the differential welfare gains, consideration of policy from a timeless perspective does not affect the ranking of alternative inflation targeting regimes derived under discretion.
Conclusion
This paper considers the choice of an inflation objective in a New Keynesian open economy model which has a direct exchange rate channel in the Phillips curve. In the model this channel results from the fact that producers care about the real exchange rate in setting prices. There are other rationales for such a real exchange rate channel in models such as those of Ball (1999) , Svensson (2000) and Froyen and Guender (2007) . With a direct exchange rate channel in the Phillips curve the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is no longer required to work exclusively through the output gap. Instead it relies as well on the real exchange rate to bring about changes in the rate of inflation.
A more expansive transmission mechanism affects the way that an optimizing central bank sets policy. If the CPI or domestic rate of inflation is the inflation objective, the current framework has policy implications that differ sharply from models such as those of Gertler (2001, 2002) and Gali and Monacelli (2005) Note: i. All disturbances are distributed independently with a mean of zero and unit variance. The parameters of the IS relation are The parameters of the Phillips curve are . ii. The IS parameters depend on structural parameters: where degree of consumption openness 0.3 intertemporal elasticity of substitution = elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign good = 1 = foreign elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic good = 2. = degree of openness of foreign economy = 0.15 = share of foreign consumption in foreign output = 0.9. Most deep parameters are the same as employed by Svensson (2000) . For further details, see Guender (2006) . iii. The numerical results are based on an adapted GAUSS algorithm originally developed by Dennis (2001) . Under domestic and CPI inflation targeting, the numerical solution procedure experienced problems achieving convergence. This problem is often encountered in the literature and is typically solved by adding an interest smoothing term to the objective function (See Svensson (2000) . To achieve convergence, we instead adjusted by a factor of 0.005 two terms under domestic inflation and CPI inflation targeting, respectively: iv. CPIT = CPI Inflation Targeting, DOMIT = Domestic Inflation Targeting, REXIT = Real-Exchange-Rate-Adjusted Inflation Targeting 
